Previous research has explored whether female managers perform better under the supervision of a female executive, given that in woman-led firms females may receive more mentoring or higher pay. In this paper we study differences in observed performance and turnover patterns based on workers' gender and supervisors' propensity to hire and retain females. We use longitudinal data on athletic directors and head coaches of NCAA Division I women's teams. We exploit the mobility of athletic directors across schools to estimate director fixed effects in the share of female head coaches, holding constant any time-invariant school-specific factors. We find that directors matter for the fraction of female head coaches, but there is no statistical difference in the distribution of the estimated fixed effects by gender of the athletic director. While team performance is negatively related to the probability of separation of the head coach, the relationship is stronger for females when their supervisor has a more pronounced preference for working with men. Furthermore, the relationship between the estimated fixed effects and coaches' improvement in performance over the course of a worker-supervisor match is positive for female coaches and negative for male coaches, consistent with a type-based mentoring model. Overall, our findings indicate that the careers of male and female workers may progress differently depending on the propensity of their supervisors to work with and mentor females, and more focus should be placed on this propensity rather than on supervisor gender. JEL Classification Codes: J44, J70, M50 * Draft. Please do not cite without permission.
Introduction
Since Bertrand and Schoar (2003) showed in their seminal work that top managers influence corporate behavior and performance, researchers have looked into whether and how those at the top matter in a variety of settings. The role of gender composition at top levels of the firm and its interaction with various firm characteristics and outcomes has been a question of interest. In particular, researchers have explored whether female managers perform better under the supervision of a female executive, given that in woman-led firms females may receive more mentoring or higher pay. As far as understanding the underlying mechanism, Athey, Avery and Zemsky (2000) make an important contribution by building a theoretical model of type-based mentoring in which entry-level workers learn more effectively if their supervisors are of a matching type, and point out the need for alternative data sources, in particular panel data on firms with similar hierarchical structures, for the empirical investigation of type-based mentoring.
In this paper we focus on one workplace setting whose features make it very suitable to study empirically the relationship between supervisor characteristics and the career progression of lower-level managers who differ along some easily observable dimension.
Our contribution goes further, in that we also introduce the idea that observable characteristics may not be sufficient to define "type" in the mentoring relationship. We use a unique data set that identifies the athletic director, as well as the identity of the head coach and performance record for six women's sports at all NCAA Division I programs during a twelve-year period. The structure of the data make it possible to track athletic directors and coaches across institutions and to compare outcomes at a set of workplaces where the internal hierarchy is homogeneous, mobility is fairly high, and a consistent quantifiable measure of performance exists.
We utilize the longitudinal nature of our data to estimate how much athletic directors influence the gender composition of head coaches above and beyond the university culture, an approach similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) . It is important for our identifi-cation that athletic directors are responsible for personnel decisions and have some level of discretion into how much focus the school places on each sport's success, for example through decisions about how much effort to put into fundraising to improve training facilities. We then use the inferred "female-friendliness" of the top-level administrators in our data as an explanatory variable in regressions of performance and retention of head coaches. We show that female coaches who are hired by a female-friendly athletic director see an increase in performance, as measured by team winning percentage, over the course of the coach-director match. The relationship is reversed for male coaches.
Interestingly, these trends are not observed when the coach's tenure exceeds that of the athletic director, consistent with a model in which supervisors make their hiring and mentoring decisions jointly. We also find that female-friendly athletic directors are more likely to retain a female coach conditional on observing poor performance than directors whose type falls at the other end of the spectrum.
In our data, female athletic directors are no more likely to be female-friendly than their male counterparts. This is important because it indicates that studies that focus only on gender fail to account for important components of the mentoring relationship.
Overall, our findings indicate that the careers of male and female workers may progress differently depending on the inherent propensity, assumed to be exogenous, of their supervisors to work with and mentor females. While our study focuses on a very specific labor market setting, our findings should motivate researchers to place more focus on this propensity in addition to directly observable supervisor and worker characteristics such as gender.
Our paper adds to the broader strand of the literature that evaluates the performance of leaders in the context of the labor market, for example studies of differences in firm performance based on the gender of those in top-level positions (Wolfers 2006, Matsa and Miller 2013) . As an empirical investigation of the type-based mentoring hypothesis, our study is related to the theoretical model in Athey et al. (2000) , in which entry-level workers learn more effectively if their supervisors are of a matching type. In line with this theory, the implications of supervisor gender and to some extent race for the careers of lower-level employees have been explored in several recent studies. Bell, Smith, Smith and Verner (2008) find that in Danish firms, females have higher promotion probabilities when the CEO is also female; such a relationship is not found for male workers. According to the findings in Giuliano, Levine and Leonard (2011) , employees tend to have better outcomes in terms of quits, dismissals and promotions when working under a manager of the same race. Own-gender and race bias in hiring, promotions and turnover is also found in Giuliano, Levine and Leonard (2009), Giuliano and Ransom (2013) , Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey (2012) and Cohen, Broschak and Haveman (1998) . A few papers look beyond a simple observable characteristic. Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009) show that social connections between lower-level workers and their manager matter less when the manager's goal is to maximize firm performance, and Behncke, Frölich and Lechner (2010) find that in Switzerland, the unemployed are more likely to find a job if they are from the same social group as their caseworker.
A limited set of studies examine the effectiveness of leaders in settings where the objective is not necessarily profit maximization, most notably the role of school principals (Jacob and Lefgren 2008, Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin 2012) . Gender and mentoring have also been examined in the context of education, in particular secondary school outcomes (Holmlund and Sund 2008, Dee 2007) , the choice of undergraduate major (Canes and Rosen 1995 , Rask and Bailey 2002 , Bettinger and Long 2005 , along with performance in college (Carrell, Page and West 2010, Hoffmann and Oreopoulos 2009) and economics Ph.D. programs (Neumark and Gardecki 1998, Hilmer and Hilmer 2007 ).
The applied psychology and human resource management literature has addressed the relationship between gender and the amount and benefits of mentoring, but there is disagreement on how important the gender composition of the mentorship relationship is (e.g. Dreher and Ash 1990 , Dreher and Cox Jr. 1996 , Ragins and Cotton 1999 . In contrast with the idea of females mentoring other females, social scientists have used the term "Queen bee syndrome," which originates in the academic literature in the 1970s (Staines, Tavris and Jayaratne 1974) , to describe women who have reached the top ranks of their company, particularly in a male-dominated occupation, and intentionally hinder the career progress of females in the lower levels of the job ladder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out a theoretical framework that outlines how type-based mentoring can affect career outcomes in the athletic administrator and head coach setting, and section 3 provides more details about the data. The main empirical analysis follows in section 4, where we first establish the importance of athletic director fixed effects, followed by tests of the model's implications for coaches' career progression. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
We consider a firm with two job levels, one of which is managerial; in the context of the empirical application of this paper, the two positions are athletic director and head coach. Each coach c is characterized by an unobserved ability parameter a c that determines the speed of learning-by-doing, and observed type s, where s = {male, female}.
For simplicity we assume that the distribution of a does not differ by type s, but this assumption is not crucial for the predictions of the model. Athletic directors are characterized by their type m = {0, 1}, which determines their ability or willingness to mentor female coaches. Mentors of type m = 0 are more effective at improving the performance of male coaches over time, and female coaches acquire human capital more quickly under type m = 1 supervisors, conditional on the ability parameter a.
Observed performance (team winning percentage) every season is a noisy signal of the coach's productivity, denoted by η:
Productivity increases over time with mentoring:
where x ict is the length of time the coach has worked under the current athletic director i. Initial ability a and mentoring are additively separable in the model proposed by Athey et al. (2000) . The human capital production function here is also similar to the Gibbons and Waldman (1999) setup, where the speed of learning-by-doing differs by worker type. When the parameter θ depends on s and m, our model corresponds to Athey et al.'s (2000) idea of "type-based" mentoring, and we can write (1) as Then the expected value of retaining coach c for one more season is V (a e ct , θ(s, m)), while the expected value of hiring a new coach is constant at V 0 . We observe a separation if
The first testable prediction of the model is that coach performance improves more quickly over the course of the worker-supervisor match when female coaches are paired with athletic directors of type m = 1 and male coaches work under administrators with m = 0. If we assume additive separability between a and θf (x t ), similar to Athey et al. (2000) , we have that
Second, the model predicts that the probability of separation is decreasing in w t , since
Third, the model predicts that the probability of separation increases less after a low realization of w t when θ is larger:
This follows from V 12 < 0: the value of retaining a coach decreases less quickly when the expectation a e t is adjusted downward if θ is larger. In section 4.2 we first test the latter two predictions (section 4.2.1), and next we test the first prediction in section 4.2.2. It should be noted that this model does not imply taste-based discrimination.
The underlying assumption is that certain types of supervisors are more effective at improving the performance of a given type of worker through mentoring, but we do not discuss the reasons for the variation in mentor types.
Data

Sample Construction
It is likely that the role that institutional culture plays for the share and success of female workers is non-negligible, whether we are looking at firms or athletic programs and head coaches. In order to identify the influence of athletic directors separately from school-level factors, we use a panel data set that tracks athletic directors across programs. We construct an athletic director -coach -university matched panel data Giuliano and Ransom (2013) , are focused on one employer and any firm-specific factors cannot be differenced out.
The gender of each athletic director and the tenure at their current school are identified through web searches. For six women's sports -basketball, field hockey, lacrosse, soccer, softball and volleyball -we record the gender of the head coach, current tenure, total number of years of experience as a head coach, and the team's winning percentage for each season. This information is provided on the NCAA website 2 . We restrict our analysis to women's sports because for the men's Division I sports for which the NCAA provides head coach and season-by-season performance data, the fraction of female coaches is either equal to or is very close to zero; more information is available in the NCAA Member Institutions' Personnel Report (2011).
These data allow us to track athletic directors and head coaches as they change schools. We record the starting month, when available, Our identification approach uses only schools for which at least one of the athletic directors is observed at multiple programs, so we impose this restriction on the data. 
Sample Description
While female athletic directors are underrepresented in Division I athletics, there has been a trend toward greater diversity among athletic administrators holding this top position. On the other hand, the fraction of female coaches in our data has decreased somewhat. Figure 1 shows how the percent of female coaches and athletic directors in the sample has changed from the 1993-1994 academic year to the 2010-2011 academic year. We exclude lacrosse and field hockey from the head coach gender ratio because as Table 1 illustrates, these sports are nearly always coached by women. Aside from temporary variations, the fraction of female athletic directors stayed fairly constant at Figure 1 emphasizes that our empirical strategy of identifying athletic director fixed effects only off of movers is preferable to estimating a fixed effect for all administrators in the data,
given that programs that differ on observable and most likely on unobservable characteristics experienced different trends during the sample period. The gender distribution in our sample is similar to the labor market more generally defined if a parallel is drawn between the athletic director position and that of top corporate executives on the one hand, and head coaches and lower-level managers on the other. Matsa and Miller (2011) report that in their sample of publicly traded US companies, the share of females among the firm's top five executives increases from 3.2 percent to 6 percent between 1997 , and Bertrand and Hallock (2001 point out that 41.4 percent of firm managers (occupation codes between 3 and 22) in the Current Population Survey were female in the early to mid-1990s. Table 1 gives the female fraction of coaches by sport and the number of teams in the sample that compete in each sport. The fraction of female coaches ranges from 0.35 for soccer to 0.72 for softball to over 0.9 for lacrosse and field hockey. Since the latter two sports are coached by females almost by default, it is possible that for those coaches the athletic director's inherent propensity to work with females has different implications compared to other sports in the data. In section 4.2 we perform the empirical analysis both with and without lacrosse and field hockey and find that disparities in the treatment of female coaches are, in fact, likely. compared to 7.8 years of experience) and achieve higher winning percentages, regardless of coach gender, but it is unclear how much of the difference is due to program-specific factors. Turnover rates and average coach tenure are fairly similar among the two groups of administrators, especially among male coaches. Male coaches have a slightly higher average winning percentage and are slightly less likely to leave their current position:
89 percent of male coaches and 87 percent of female coaches are observed at the same school during the following year. The average coach tenure in all subsamples is a little over 5.5 years. The average observed coach-athletic director spell is 2.6 years for both male and female coaches. Most of the analysis focusses on the subsamples in columns 1 and 2 of Our measure of an athletic director's "female friendliness" is based on directors' heterogeneity in the propensity to hire and retain female coaches. The gender distribution of coaches at a given program is likely to be influenced by school-specific factors that may vary over time. Our identification strategy is based on athletic directors who are observed at multiple schools. We estimate a model of the fraction of females coaching sports in our data at school j in academic year t:
We include school and year fixed effects to account for differences across institutions and over time in the gender composition of coaching staffs. The variable δ i is an athletic director fixed effect estimated for administrators who are observed holding this position for more than two full seasons at multiple Division I programs during the sample period.
This approach is similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and ensures that these athletic directors have enough time to make personnel and other decisions that will affect the athletic department. Our approach is more conservative than an alternative specification in which a fixed effect is assigned to everyone who serves in the position of athletic director during part of the sample period. These fixed effects are empirically identified, but we are unable to distinguish the influence of non-movers from unrelated institutionspecific time trends concurrent with their tenure. It must, however, be pointed out that athletic directors are clearly not randomly assigned to schools, so we are not necessarily identifying a causal effect. Our approach is to pick up systematic differences in the share of female head coaches across programs and over time that we can link to individual athletic directors.
The dependent variable in equation (2) measures the fraction of female head coaches for the sports in our sample excluding lacrosse and field hockey, which are coached by females over 90 percent of the time, as shown in Table 1 . The resulting gender ratio aggregates the share of female coaches over the academic year, and athletic directors who left program j before the end of year t are assigned the same value they would have received if they had left at the end of the year. This may lead to measurement error in the dependent variable if the incoming athletic director replaced any coaches.
We choose this approach because the alternative, adjusting the gender ratio by the director's departure date, leads to greater inaccuracy. Of the sports used to construct pct f emale ijt , only softball is played during the spring season, and as Table 1 shows, more females coach softball than basketball, soccer or volleyball. If softball is excluded from the calculation of the share of female coaches for administrators who left in January for example, we will systematically underestimate pct f emale for the year of departure.
The fixed effects in equation (2) are constructed for athletic directors who spent more than two full years at each school where they are observed, which excludes interim directors. Observations for which athletic director tenure is equal to zero are also excluded from the estimation. Since it is possible that coaching staff adjustments require time, this restriction allows us to use data that are less likely to reflect the previous director's choices. The predictive power of the model increases with the above sample restrictions.
We also estimate a version of equation (2) in which the dependent variable is replaced with a school-specific average of the winning percentages for sports in our sample, including lacrosse and field hockey, in a given academic year. 5 This model is intended to test whether individual athletic directors have an impact on performance that can be separated from any institution-specific trends. The estimated winning fixed effects are a measure of one dimension of athletic director quality.
The estimation results for the two outcomes of interest are summarized in Table 3 .
Columns 1 and 2 show results for the female fraction of coaches, while columns 3 and 4 reflect the use of average winning percentage as a dependent variable. In each case the first set of results (columns 1 and 3) does not include any director fixed effects. We report the adjusted R 2 from each model, as well as the F-statistic for the joint significance test of all director indicator variables.
The results in Table 3 show evidence of non-negligible athletic director effects. The estimates also suggest that athletic director heterogeneity has a stronger impact on the gender composition of head coaches than for team performance for the sports we use in the estimation. In the first set of regressions, the adjusted R 2 increases from 0.49 to 0.56 when the athletic director fixed effects are included, and the F-statistic for the set of 137 binary variables is 4.51. In the average winning percentage regressions, the increase in the adjusted R 2 is less pronounced (0.43 to 0.47), and the F-statistic for the set of 137 fixed effects is lower (2.64). Both F-statistics allow us to reject the null hypothesis that all fixed effects equal zero at very high levels of significance.
Distribution of the Estimated Fixed Effects
Given the evidence in Table 3 that athletic director heterogeneity is important for the gender composition and the performance of head coaches, we proceed to examine in more detail the distribution of the estimated fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are then used as explanatory variables in section 4.2 so they are adjusted to account for the additional estimation variance. The adjustment is based on Bayesian shrinkage (Morris 1983) and is similar to the approach taken by most studies of teacher or principal effectiveness (e.g. Jacob and Lefgren 2008 , Leigh 2010 , Branch et al. 2012 . Letδ To test for statistical significance of the gender difference in the adjusted fixed effects, in panel B of Table 4 we show results from an OLS specification (column 1) and quantile regressions at the 25 th , 50 th and 75 th percentiles (columns 2-4) ofδ A st on an indicator for female athletic director and a constant term. We weigh each observation by the inverse of the OLS variance of each fixed effect estimate (ŝe 2 i ) so that more weight is placed on individuals whose heterogeneity parameters are estimated more precisely. The gender coefficients are not statistically significant but have signs that reflect the trends in panel A. The R 2 of the OLS regression in column 1 is low: 0.001. Based on the small sample of female athletic directors in the data we can conjecture that supervisor gender and "female-friendliness" 6 are be unrelated.
We also estimate a model of the form
whose purpose is to test for a relationship between the estimated adjusted winning percentage fixed effects and the fixed effects from the female share of coaches regression.
Observations are again weighted by the inverse ofŝe 
Implications for the Career Progression of Female Head Coaches 4.2.1 Performance and Mobility
We next test the main empirical predictions of the theoretical model in section 2. The model implies that when the objective is to maximize winning percentage, the value of retaining a coach increases with the observed winning percentage w t , and therefore we expect to see an inverse relationship between w t and the probability of separation.
When athletic directors, in their role of mentors in the context of out study, differ in the value they add to mentees (coaches) over time, we will see a difference in the rate at which coaches are dismissed following a bad season. In particular, female friendly athletic directors will be less likely to dismiss a female coach based on poor current season performance than directors with low values ofδ A st . To explore how a supervisor's "female-friendliness" impacts coach turnover in the data, we estimate a survival model in which failure is defined as a separation. We assume a Weibull proportional-hazards survival distribution: given current coach tenure t, the hazard function takes the form λ(t; X) = exp(XB)αt α−1 .
The parameter α is estimated along with the vector of coefficients B. One advantage of the Weibull specification is that it allows for duration dependence. The explanatory variables contained in X include controls for athletic director gender andδ A st , the difference in team winning percentage between the current and previous season, and interactions between the change in winning percentage and supervisor gender and female friendliness. We also include athletic director tenure and tenure squared, a quadratic in coach experience, and year, school and sport dummy variables.
7 Including the difference in winning percentage compared to the previous season instead of current performance adds a dynamic component to the model, allowing us to control better for team-specific trends, but does not change the results substantially. However, the estimation sample has to exclude observations from 1994 because we do not observe team performance in 1993. The model is estimated separately for male and female coaches. Since lacrosse and field hockey are almost exclusively coached by females, one can argue that gender will play a different role in these sports compared to sports in which administrators are more likely to have an impact on the coach's gender. For this reason we show two sets of results, with and without lacrosse and field hockey. Since we useδ A st as a regressor, the sample is limited to observations for which this parameter is estimated, namely teams currently lead by athletic directors who are observed at another school at some point during the sample period. Table 5 shows estimation results for all female coaches (column 1), female coaches 7 We estimated alternative models in which the school and sport indicators were replaced with teamspecific binary variables. The results for female coaches were similar, but the sample of male coaches is not sufficiently large for this model to be fully identified. Sample limitations also made problematic the estimation of a more flexible relationship between tenure and separation compared to the monotonic hazard implied by the Weibull distribution.
excluding lacrosse and field hockey (column 2), all male coaches (column 3) and male coaches excluding lacrosse and field hockey (column 4). Due to the small number of male coaches in lacrosse and field hockey, columns 3 and 4 are almost identical. The table reports the estimates for the coefficients contained in the vector B; positive coefficients are associated with variables that increase the hazard, or decrease the probability of survival (remaining with the team). None of the coefficients on the female director indicator are statistically significant, but they are negative in columns 1 and 2 and positive in the male coach specifications, suggesting that female athletic directors may be less likely to dismiss female coaches and more likely to dismiss male coaches, regardless of performance. There is a similar trend associated with the female-friendly measure, and it is significant at the 5 percent level in columns 3 and 4. This observation is consistent with the fact that the variable was constructed to reflect the female share of coaches that a given administrator works with. The difference between winning percentage in seasons τ and τ − 1 is negative and statistically significant in all four specifications, indicating that relatively poor performance in year τ makes it more likely that a new coach is observed in year τ + 1, and this applies to both genders.
The main coefficients of interest in Table 5 are on the interaction between the winning percentage change from the previous season and the female-friendly measure. This coefficient is positive and significant at the five percent level in column 1 and larger and significant at the one percent level in column 2, when lacrosse and field hockey coaches are excluded from the sample of female coaches. This suggests that for female coaches performance matters less for turnover when the athletic director is female-friendly. Interestingly, this result is stronger in the sports in which we observe nontrivial variation in coach gender. The corresponding coefficients in the male coach regressions are negative but close to zero and not statistically significant. The interaction between current season performance, relative to the previous season, and director gender is statistically indistinguishable from zero, but the point estimates are positive and large for male coaches. The estimate for the parameter α is statistically different from 1 and indicates positive duration dependence for all subsamples: the probability of coach turnover tends to increase with tenure.
Performance and the Length of the Coach-Athletic Director Match
The other theoretic prediction outlined in section 2 is that coach performance improves more quickly over the course of the worker-supervisor match when female coaches are paired with female friendly athletic directors and male coaches work under administrators of the opposite type, who have a comparative advantage in mentoring male workers. We investigate whether an athletic director's attitude towards working with female coaches is related to the variation in performance of coaches over time. Under a typebased mentoring story in the context of our study, performance would improve faster for female mentees (head coaches) when the mentor (athletic director) is of a female-friendly type. For male coaches, performance would improve slower when the athletic director is female-friendly. A mentoring relationship is expected to be stronger when a coach was hired by the current athletic director rather than by a previous administrator. We use team winning percentage to measure performance; this is an appropriate measure based on our finding in Table 3 that athletic directors have an influence on winning percentage when all time-invariant school-specific factors are differenced out.
We estimate the following regression for coach c in sport s at school j in year t working under athletic director i:
The variable T measures the number of years the coach has worked under the current athletic director at school j. When the director's tenure exceeds the tenure of the head coach, T equals he coach's tenure; otherwise T is set to equal the tenure of the athletic director. The variables contained in the vector Z include quadratics in the athletic director's tenure and the coach's tenure and experience. We estimate (4) separately for coaches who were hired by the current athletic director (coach tenure is less than or equal to athletic director tenure) and coaches who were hired by a previous director (coach tenure exceeds athletic director tenure). The match length T does not enter the model uninteracted because it equals one of the tenure variables, depending on the sample restriction. This model includes team (school by sport) indicators; the results are similar when we include separate school and sport-specific binary variables and coach fixed effects. We also control for athletic director gender and its interaction with the length of the coach -director match. Since we compare a coach's current performance to her performance during the previous year, we exclude from the sample observations for which coach tenure equals zero. We again show results with and without lacrosse and field hockey for female coaches. Since the same restriction has negligible impact on the sample of male coaches, for them we only show results with lacrosse and field hockey.
The inverse of the OLS variance of the fixed effects estimated from (2) is used as weight.
The estimation results for the regression in (4) are shown in Table 6 . The lagged performance variable is positive and highly significant for female coaches and positive and significant but smaller for males. For female coaches who were hired under the current athletic director (columns 1 and 2), performance is initially worse but improves faster when the athletic director is female-friendly (negative coefficient onδ A st that is significant at the 10 percent level and positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the estimated fixed effect with the length of the coach-director match). The relationship is stronger when lacrosse and field hockey coaches are excluded from the sample. On average, a female coach hired by an athletic director whose assigned fixed effect is one standard deviation above the mean sees a decline in winning percentage equal to 0.024 after one full year with the team, but performance for this coach-director pair improves faster than the baseline (director fixed effect equal zero) after 5 years of working together.
The relationship is reversed for male coaches, whose performance improves faster when the athletic director they work for is assigned a fixed effect below the mean. Such relationship is not observed based on the gender of the athletic director.
Columns 4-6 of Table 6 suggest that any improvement in coach performance over time is unrelated to the gender or female friendliness of the athletic director when the coach was hired by a previous administrator. The coefficients on the interaction T cijt × (δ Table 6 should be considered in combination with the findings from the survival model in the previous section. Female friendly administrators are less likely to dismiss female coaches based on poor performance so holding everything else constant, under the implied selection mechanism we should observe a relative decline in the observed average performance of female coaches working under female-friendly supervisors. In fact, we see the opposite trend in Table 6 , which leads us to believe that more than a pure taste-based discrimination sorting mechanism is needed to explain the observed trends. In this study we have proposed type-based mentoring as the missing link between Tables 5 and 6.
Conclusion
Previous research has established that individuals at the top levels of the firm have strong potential to affect overall performance. There is a growing body of literature that explores the mechanisms through which these leaders matter. In many cases high-level managers make personnel decisions or interact with mid-level managers, possibly in a mentorship role. Managers may be better able to detect the true ability of a subordinate if they share a characteristic, such as gender. Worker-manager type matches may make the role of mentorship more effective or alternatively there may be discrimination against members of the firm who do not share the same characteristic as the top manager.
We extend this literature by allowing unobservable characteristics to drive supervisors' level of support for female mid-level managers, which places additional burdens on the data in order to determine who is more female-friendly. We find evidence in our sample of NCAA Division I athletic directors and head coaches of heterogeneity in the propensity to hire and retain females, which is identified separately from institutionspecific constant and time-varying factors by focusing on administrators observed at multiple programs. We show that a supervisor's female-friendliness is a much stronger predictor of coaches' success and turnover, compared to the role that athletic director gender plays. The relationships we document in this specific labor market may not be immediately generalizable to broader labor market settings, but the conclusions we draw about the productivity of mentoring relationships are novel and should motivate researchers to explore further the role of unobservables. .10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The samples exclude observations with 0 years of coach tenure. The specifications also include controls for athletic director tenure and tenure squared, coach tenure, tenure squared, experience, and experience squared, as well as year and school by sport indicators.
